WebSoK: Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions. Sílvia Casacuberta (Harvard University), Julia Hesse (IBM Research Europe - Zurich), Anja Lehmann (Hasso-Plattner-Institute, University of Potsdam) WatchAuth: User Authentication and Intent Recognition in … WebSoK: Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions (EuroS&P) Sílvia Casacuberta, Julia Hesse, Anja Lehmann: SoK: Plausibly Deniable Storage (PETS) Chen Chen, Xiao Liang, Bogdan Carbunar, Radu Sion: SoK: Practical Foundations for Software Spectre Defenses (S&P) Sunjay Cauligi, Craig Disselkoen, Daniel Moghimi, Gilles Barthe, Deian Stefan
Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions from Isogenies SpringerLink
WebOblivious Pseudorandom Functions MichaelJ.Freedman1,YuvalIshai2,BennyPinkas3,andOmerReingold4 1 … WebIn recent years, oblivious pseudorandom functions (OPRFs) have become a ubiquitous primitive used in cryptographic protocols and privacy-preserving technologies. The growing interest in OPRFs, both theoretical and applied, has produced a vast number of different constructions and functionality variations. In this paper, we provide a systematic ... ul wellness condoms
PUOKMS: Password-Protected Updatable Oblivious Key ... - Springer
WebWe describe a lightweight protocol for oblivious evaluation of a pseudorandom function (OPRF) in the presence of semihonest adversaries. In an OPRF protocol a receiver has an input r; the sender gets output s and the receiver gets output F(s; r), where F is a pseudorandom function and s is a random seed. Webdom function, where one party inputs the key to the pseudorandom function, and the other inputs the elements of its set. Denoting the pseudorandom function by F,thein-put of party P1 by X, and the input of party P2 by Y, we have that at the end of this stage party P2 holds the set {Fk(y)}y∈Y while P1 has learned nothing. Then, P1 just needs to WebJun 1, 2024 · SoK: Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions. In recent years, oblivious pseudorandom functions (OPRFs) have become a ubiquitous primitive used in … ulwell cottage swimming pool